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In this study,recent cleavages within the 
Prosperity Party is described. For this purpose, first the 
ideologies of the National Order Party and the National 
Salvation Party are taken up. For the PP is the 
continuation of the NOP and NSP, the PP cannot be 
understood as distinct from these two parties. It is then 
delienaced the recent cleaveges within the PP arose out of 
the leadership oligarchy within the PP and its integration 
into the oresent svstem.
ABSTRACT
Finally, it is indicated on which subjects there 
are differences between the views of the mainstream PP and 
the anti-system faction within the PP. These subjects are 
listed as follows: criticisms to present system, 
"secularism", "Kemalism" and the relations v/ith other 
Muslim countries. There are serious differences between the 
points of view of the mainstream PP and the anti-system 
faction of the party on these subjects.
OZBT
Bu tezde, Refah Partisi içindeki son bölünmeler 
tanımlandı. Bu amaç için öncelikle Milli Nizam Partisi ve 
Milli Selamet Partisi'nin ideolojileri incelendi. Çünki 
Refah Partisi MNP ve MSP'nin devamı olduğundan, RP bu iki 
partinin ideolojisine bakılmaksızın anlaşılamaz. Daha sonra 
RP içindeki bu bölünmelerin parti içindeki liderlik 
oligarşisi ve partinin sistemie entegre olması neticesinde 
ortaya çıktığı gösterildi.
Son olarak, RP merkezi ve parti içindeki sistem 
karşıtı grubun hangi konularda farklı görüşlere sahip 
oldukları açıklandı. Bu konular şöyle sıralandı: mevcut 
sistem.e yapılan eleştiriler, "laiklik", "Atatürkçülük" ve 
diğer Müslüman ülkelerle olan ilişkiler. Yukardaki konular 
hakkında RP merkezi ve parti içindeki sistem karşıtı grubun 
görüşleri arasında ciddi farklılıklar var.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
There have been no organized Islamic pressure 
groups since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This 
situation continued until 26 January 1970 which is the date 
of the establishment of National Order Party(NOP). This 
party was the first religious party in the republican 
history. However, it was closed on 20 May 1971 by the 
Constitutional Court because of its tendency toward the 
establishment of theocratic order in Turkey.
In 1972, a new religious party, which was called 
the National Salvation Party (NSP), was set up to fill the 
place of the National Order Party. Again after the military 
intervention of September 12, 1980, the NSP was banned 
together with all other political parties.
In 1983, the Prosperity Party(PP), a new neo- 
Islamic party, was founded. The Prosperity Party is a 
continuation of both the National Order Party and che 
National Salvation Party. One may argue that Islamic 
politics has been continuing within the line of the NOP-NSP- 
PP in Turkish political structure since 1970.
The PP did not become successful in the 1987 
general election and could not get any seat in the Assembly. 
Although it got the 7.2 percent of the popular vote, it did 
not gain any seats in the Assembly because of the percentage 
barrier. Therefore, the PP, the Nationalist Labor Party and 
the Reformist Democracy Party formed an alliance before the 
1991 election. They entered the election as an alliance and 
made an important electoral success. This alliance got the 
16.9 per cent of the total vote and gained 62 seats in the 
Assembly. So it came fourth both in terms of seats gained in 
the Assembly and its vote.^ Although the PP gained an 
electoral success in the 1991 election, a cleavage within 
the PP, however, occurred.
The aim of this study is not to look at the 
similarities or differences between the NSP and the PP, but 
to look at the nature of recent cleavages within the PP. 
Before dealing with this question, the following question 
must be answered: were the NOP and the NSP, which were 
predecessors of the PP, homogeneous or heterogeneous? I 
could not find any evidence to prove that they were 
homogeneous or heterogeneous. However, Jacob Landau argues 
that even though there were cleavages among the party's top 
leaders and conflicts between rival groups within the NSP, 
the existence of these had been denied by party
spokesman.^ Landau also says that while major decisions 
were discussed in the party's executive bodies, Necmettin 
Erbakan decided, who had also led the NOP, the final 
decisions.^
Although there were some rival groups within the 
NSP, they were suppressed by party leaders. Despite the lack 
of any direct evidence, it can be argued that both the NOP 
and NSP were heterogeneous. However, after 1990 some 
Prosperity Party members and deputies, who have radical 
views about their party and the problems of Turkey, start to 
say something different from their party's ideology.
This study comprises five chapters. In the second 
chapter emergence of secularism as a state ideology and the 
historical background of the religious right in Turkey are 
explained. Therefore, the process of secularism is 
explained and the question of whether secularism was 
successful or not is also answered. The establishment of 
the NOP and NSP, which were predecessors of the PP, is 
taken then up. Also the ideologies of these parties are 
tried to be delineated. The party programs of these two 
parties are also examined. The third chapter deals with the 
following question: what is the ideology of the Prosperity 
Party? The fourth chapter analyzes the ideology of the
opposing faction within the PP. In the concluding fifth 
chapter, a comparison between the ideology of the party and 
the ideology of opposing group is studied.
NOTES
1. T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, 
Milletvekili Genel Secimi Sonuclari:20.10.1991, 
(Ankara: Basbakanlik Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, 
1992)
2. Jacob M. Landau, " The National Salvation Party in 
Turkey", Asian and African Studies. v®l.ll,
no.1, 1976. p.55.
3. Ibid., p .57.
CHAPTER TWO
Historical Background of the Religious Right
Turkish state has been secular since the 
establishment of the republic in 1923. Until 1923, the 
principal component in the ideology of the Ottoman Empire 
was Islam under Sultan-Caliph represented both temporal and 
the spiritual power.^ For Kemalist cadres after the 
national struggle, the first aim of secularization, which 
was seen as the most effective way to reform the 
traditional state system and society, was that of 
abolishing the power and the authority of Islam and its 
representatives in the political, social and cultural 
spheres and to confine it in the field of faith and 
worship.^ So they tried to create a modern, rational state 
with institutions and laws by means of secularization. 
Hence the series of secular reforms were designed to 
minimize the role of Islam in institutional and cultural 
life. The secularization program followed a four-phased 
course:^
"I) Symbolic secularization, or enforced changes 
in organizational, cultural and social life which had a 
symbolic identification with Islam. The acts of symbolic
secularization.were as follows: the abolition of the
Caliphate in 1924; the adoption of the Western hat and 
Western styles in clothing in 1925; alphabet reform (the 
change of the alphabet fi'om Arabic to Latin script in 
1928).
2) Institutional secularization, or changes in 
organizational arrangements designed to destroy the 
institutional strength of Islam. The abolition of the 
office of Şeyhu-1 Islam and Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti); the 
creation in 1924 of the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(PRA) (Diyanet -î-sleri Reisliği) which is linlced to the state 
bux'eaucracy ; the abolition in 1925 of the derviş 
brotherhoods, were all acts of institutional 
secularization.
3) Functional secularization, or changes in the 
functional specified of religious and governmental 
institutions. The religious hierarchy in Ottoman society 
controlled both the educational and the judicial process. 
Functional differentiation in these two areas was the act 
of functional secularization; the abolition of Şeriat 
courts and the unification of the court system under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in 1924. All
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schools were put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education by means of the Educational Act of 1924 (Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat Kanunu).
4) Legal secularization, or changes in the legal 
structure of the polity and society. The adoption of new 
civil, criminal and commercial codes were the acts of legal 
secularization.
Kemalist cadres put in effect a cultural 
revolution based on a new value system, the most significant 
aim of which was to express a secular, political ideology in 
the place of religion, which was used as a means of social 
identity and the origin of legitimacy for political 
authority.®
However, Kemalist world-view could not fulfil the 
place of a rival ideology to Islam.^ The founders of the 
Republic did not pay attention to the necessity of a value 
system at the level of individual.^ In addition it can be 
argued that the Republic failed at the level of basic 
central values. Each community is founded on a fundamental 
philosophy, which forms a world-view in the individual's 
mind. The original weakness of the republic was the lack of 
this philosophy: it cannot be said that Kemalism had
profound and comprehensive philosophical bases.® As a 
result of these ideological weaknesses, religious ideology 
could survive.
The secularization process went into reverse with 
the transition to the multi-party period. As Feroz Ahmad
points out:
The introduction of multi-party 
politics and the competition for votes 
forced the RPP[the Republican People's 
Party] and the opposition parties to 
reconsider their attitudes to religion. 
It was the RPP which had to take the 
initiative because many of its reforms 
during che past twenty years, bringing 
little direct benefit to the people, 
had made them apathetic and even 
hostile.®
Because the Republican People's Party believed that the 
Democratic Party(DP) could attract conservative people to 
its side, the RPP Ministry of Education added elective 
courses on religion into the primary school curriculum; it 
also established courses for the training of prayer 
leaders(imams) and preachers(hatips). In 1948, foreign 
currency purchasing rights was given to those wanting to go 
on pilgrimage to Mecca, and in 1949 the tombs of saints and 
other holy men were reopened for visitors.^®
The DP realized that this change of policy 
endangered their position and tried to protect themselves
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by continuing to accuse the RPP of being hostile to
I s l a m . A h m a d  indicates furthermore that:
Even without the introduction of multi­
party politics it is probable that the 
RPP would have relaxed its militant 
secularism and adopted a more liberal 
attitude towards Islam. Such a change 
would have made the regime more 
popular... But with multi-party 
politics the element of competition was 
brought in, inevitably making the issue 
political. Neither party was about to 
permit a counter-revolution to 
secularization. But, on the other hand, 
both parties had to pay a price for 
their votes. Before the 1950 election 
the Democrats could-make only promises 
while the Republicans made the 
concessions; but it was the Democrats 
who won.
After the first free elections, the winning party, 
the DP continued this reversal of secularization. What were 
"reversed" were in fact minor revisions of policy that they 
implemented, such as the lifting of the ban on the recital 
of the ezan in Arabic, the broadcasting of Koran readings 
over the state radio, the establishment of religious 
schools, and the expansion of the PRA's budget which were 
heavily criticized by both secular press and the RPP leaders 
as major steps toward the establishment of a non-secular 
s t a t e . B u t  for the DP true restoration of the freedom of 
conscience could no longer be delayed and the party was only 
following a process which was begun by the RPP.^^ During
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the first four years in power the DP had no need to use
Islam. Metin Heper explains here the reason as follows:
The Democrat party placed greater 
emphasis on religion only when it 
faced serious economic problems after 
the mid-1950s.
However, during the 1957 electoral campaign the DP 
and the Nur sect formed an alliance. But military 
intervention of May 1960 put an end to this alliance. Şerif 
Mardin explains the reason of this intervention as follows:
Part of the motivation of the military 
in intervening in Turkish politics was 
its conviction that a number of Muslim 
'fanatics', such as the leader of the 
Nur sect, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, were 
about to turn Turkey back to what it 
perceived as a theocratic regime. The 
secularist principles of the Turkish 
Republic were being undermined, and the 
generals felt that they had to prevent 
this.^^
After the military intervention of 1960, there was a 
widespread belief that the military regime, which replaced 
the DP, would take an offensive stance against the reversal 
process of secularization and restore a militant secularism 
of the single party era. But the National Unity Committee 
had no such intentions and it began to counter this 
propaganda by adopting a favorable attitude toward 
I s l am.Then, a new constitution, which was supportive 
of liberal, pluralist politics and not supportive of 
concentration of power, was prepared.^® This constitution
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allowed genuine associational freedoms which resulted in the 
mushrooming of a variety of organizations throughout the 
decade, include religious groups. In this liberal political 
environment, religious forces were able to establish a 
political party of their own under the name of National
Order Party 19
2.1.National Order Party
The National Order Party (NOP) was established on 
26 January 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. 
The party's program and speeches of its leaders stressed 
democratic and progressive views but a detailed analysis
reveals the party's Islamic character, 
describes the NOP's program as:
20 Jacob Landau
a moralist's delight, explaining its 
approach to spiritual values in 
carefully chosen words, often of Arabic 
origin, that left in no doubt the 
party's strong attachment to Islam. 
Further, its program advocated freedom 
of conscience, but interpreted it to 
mean freedom for religious -i.e., 
Islamic- education. The implication was 
that in secularist Turkey, Islamic' 
education was handicapped and that the 
NOP was its best defender.
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According to the NOP's world-view, although 
capitalist and socialist systems are seen as different, both 
were the same in their nature. Both are materialist, self- 
seeking and imperialist. They sought to enslave other 
nations through imposing their own culture and economic 
interests on them. Despite their material progress, both 
systems were caught up in a spiritual crisis.
The NOP divided Turkey's domestic problems into 
two categories. These were material and spiritual. In the 
material field the NOP criticized the dependence of the 
Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital, a low level 
of per capita income and an unjust distribution of wealth, 
and a generally weak economy. As a result of all these 
elements, Turkey has become dependent completely on foreign 
aid and lost its initiative in foreign policy. In the 
spiritual field the NOP's criticisms centered around its 
claim that Turkey was the only nation in the world where the 
educational system failed to educate the youth for national 
ends and besides Turkey's educational policy was based upon 
the removal of its own history. "' It adopted the West's 
inadequate world-view which had plunged the Western 
countries themselves into a spiritual crisis. -Although 
there Vías not any direct attack on secularism, the program
13
insisted on rejecting any interpretation of secularism which 
could be considered hostile towards Islam.
The NOP, it was stated, would aim to modernize the 
country through both spiritual and material programs. 
According to the party's assessment, Turkey would catch up 
with Western technology only if the superior culture and 
morality of the Turkish nation could be revived.^®
After the military intervention of 12 March 1971, 
the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) ordered the 
party's dissolution on the ground that it was seeking "to 
restore a theocratic order in Turkey" (20 May 1971) In 
its place, a new party, the National Salvation Party, was 
founded on 11 October 1972 under the de facto leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan, although the formal leader was Süleyman 
Arif Emre.^® At the beginning Erbakan prudently refrained 
from taking any formal position in the new party. He did not 
v;ant to recognize the obvious connection between the two 
p a r t i es.Erbakan became the leader of the NSP after the 
October 1973 elections in which the NSP made a notable 
achievement.
14
2.2 National Salvation Party
The National Salvation Party (NSP) was set up by 
nineteen founders, many of whom had been involved in the 
NOP, making clear that the NSP was an unchanged continuation 
of the NOP.^ '^ The NSP's v;orld-view and program were 
basically the same as the NOP's although the leadership was 
more careful this time to express its views within legal
l i m i t s .32
The party's aim was to bring to nation "happiness"
and "security" by means of spiritual and material progress.
In order to attain spiritual progress, the rights and 
freedoms of individual should be guaranteed and internal 
peace within a democratic regime should be achieved. There 
was a call for spiritual outlook which in turn was dependent 
upon a virtuous society In order to attain a model of 
modern civilization, we ought to be proud of our glorious 
heritage and ancient traditions, the argument went The 
NSP insisted that the Turks had lost their power and 
influence because they alienated themselves from their ov/n 
cultural heritage while at the same time they had failed to 
industrialize Binnaz Toprak elaborates:
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According to the leaders of the NSP, 
Turks took from the West what they 
needed least, namely, Western culture, 
which is inferior to the Turkish. And 
they failed to box'row what they needed 
most, namely. Western technology. The 
NSP sees no positive relationship 
between the West's technical 
superiority and ics cultural 
heritage.
It should be noted that many items in the NSP 
program and policies had no clear or explicit Islamic 
origin. Particularly important among these was the party's 
strong emphasis on rapid industrialización.^"^ For the NSP, 
the question of industrialization was an important one 
because it relates to the party's general view of Turkish 
history: the Turkish nation had failed to industrialize and, 
therefore, had lost its important place in history. Once 
Turkey reembraces its cultural past and develops the 
spiritual and moral qualities necessary for hard work, it 
will become a strong industrial society. It was almost with 
a religious zeal that Erbakan and other party leaders 
repeatedly pointed out their commitment to 
industrializat o Rapid development of heavy industry 
v;as seen as the surest way for Turkey to regain its 
historical Dov;er and influence in the world.
The NSP's ideology was an interesting mixture of 
religious and nonreligious themes. On the religious side, 
the NSP which was operating under legal rules explicitly
16
forbidding the use religion for political purposes, 
prudently refraining from a frontal attack on secularism 
and making an explicitly Islamic appeal. But throughout its 
program, election campaigns and leadership statements, the 
NSP consistently stressed a "national point of view" and 
national and moral values, which were commonly and correctly 
understood as Islamic.
The influence of the Islamic values upon the NSP 
program was reflected in the party's opposition to lending 
money at interest. Interest was seen as a means of 
exploitation. It was argued that high interest rates led to 
high production costs and high prices which caused 
misery for the consumer.
Again in the field of foreign policy, the 
influence of Islamic values could be found in the NSP's 
program. The NSP advocated close relations with other Muslim 
Nations and it hoped for the creation of a Muslim Economic 
Community. The party was against Turkey's accession to 
European Community. This opposition was justified on 
religious grounds. It was argued that Turkish national, 
moral, cultural and ethical values would be degenerated as 
a result of close relationships with European countries. 
Also it was stated that the possible entrance of Turkey to
17
European Community would 
development.
hinder the industrial
One major component of the NSP's understanding of
culture was the importance of the history. The NSP
leadership was considering the recreating of a powerful
Muslim nation as one of its major goals. Toprak states:
Such a goal is religiously significant 
since, in Muslim thought, the vision of 
great civilization is closely connected 
with the religious mission of following 
the divine command to establish a just 
and powerful Muslim community.
The NSP argued that in order to regain a world prominence, 
the Turkish nation would have to regain its consciousness as 
a Muslim society with a distinguished historical
mission 44
A second component of the NSP's concept of culture 
was the importance of the family and the social life.·^^ 
The party saw the family as the basis of the society. It 
sought a lessening of foreign influences and a strengthening 
of parental control for the formation of a child's moral, 
religious and spiritual character.“^®
The NSP stood for social justice and encouraged 
all forms of normal legal profit, but it opposed
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exploitation of any kind.·^”^ The NSP had been quite severe 
in its criticisms of rising prices, unemployment rates, lack 
of adequate social security and medical insurance programs, 
misuse of governmental credit which worked in favor of the 
supporters of the government, high interest rates, an unjust 
taxation system, inadequate low-income housing, and the 
unjust distribution of wealth.·^®
The NSP also took up the issue of education. 
According co the NSP, if Turkey was to regain its historical 
"greatness" and become an industrial society, it had to 
adopt the right educational policy. The NSP made a 
connection betv/een the underdevelopment of Turkey and the 
inadequate educational policy of Turkish governments. For 
the NSP on the one hand this educational policy based on the 
rejection of national history and culture. On the other hand 
it was based on the imitation of Western civilization and 
technology. As a result, an educational policy which failed 
to encourage creativity, emerged.·^® So the NSP argued that 
in order to modernize, Turkish governments had to provide a 
higher education which would foster creativity and not 
"imitation".®°
The NSP based its appeal not on the religion alone 
but also on a well-defined political philosophy far more
19
thorough than those of previous parties(such as DP) which 
tried to use religion for political purposes. The NSP called 
such philosophy the "national point of view" (Milli Görüş) . 
The NSP defined the RPP's point of view as the "leftist 
point of view" and the point of view of the Justice Party 
(JP) and other parties on the right as the "liberal or 
colorless point of view"; according to the NSP, both were 
alien philosophies imported from the West. Contrary to them 
the NSP advocated a political point of view that was 
considered as indigenous and one which called for a return 
to national historical r o o t s . T h e  NSP defined the 
"leftist point of view" and the "liberal point of view" 
essentially as materialist and "national point of view" 
essentials as moral.
The first principle of the "national point of 
view" was to put an end to waste; where there was waste, 
there was no wealth. Its second principle was to abolish 
lending money at interest, which made the rich richer and
f“ ·- ■
the poor poorer; abolishing interest in the financial system 
could lower prices. Its third principle concerned the 
taxation system; taxes had to be imposed on capital and 
wealth, not on profits. Investments had to be directed to 
factory building, rather than to stadiums or liquor­
dispensing hotels. The state had to provide all necessary
20
infrastructure services, but ownership of factories should 
remain in the hands of the private entrepreneurs.
So the ideology of the NSP can be summarized under 
the five headings: "national point of view", rapid 
industrialization, historical-cultural sensitivity, 
education and social justice.
According to Toprak, the NSP movement was an 
expression of economic discontent through religion rather 
than purely religious concerns. This is the reason of the 
appeal of the NSP to most of the voters: the NSP appeared on 
the Turkish political scene as an Islamic party with the aim 
of retraditionalization in social and cultural life along 
Islamic principles. Within a short period of time, it became 
successful in sending its messages to the electorate. 
The NSP was electorally successful either in the least 
developed or in the most rapidly developing regions. The 
NSP's greater success in the least developed provinces may 
be explained by its emphasis on the traditional-Islamic 
values. Its success in most rapidly developing provinces was 
an expression of some form of protest by marginal 
individuals such as small traders, artisans and small 
shopkeepers v;ho had lost their economic power as a result of 
development of big capitalists in these r e g i o n s . S u c h
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marginal individuals thought that the disappearance of 
traditional Islamic community has parallelled the 
disappearance of traditional economic activities. They 
believed that their economic activity leads them into a 
squeeze between organized labor and organized business.^® 
Mardin points out that:
As for NSP support, although there is 
some correlation between NSP votes and 
economic underdevelopment, the 
provinces where the NSP is strongest 
are not the least economically 
developed. Its support is found in 
areas with incomes below the median, 
but also in the conservative quarters 
of large towns.
2.3 The Success of the NSP in the 1973 Elections
The NSP's electoral success was noteworthy in both 
the National Assembly and the Senate. In the former, it came 
fourth in terms of the popular vote, close behind the 
Democratic Party of Ferruh Bozbeyli, but third in the 
numbers of seats gained in the Assembly. In the Senate, it 
came third in terms of both its vote and in the number of 
seats gained.^®
Jacob Landau explains the success of the NSP in 
the 1973 elections as follows: first, it was indirectly
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assisted by the decline of its main rival, the JP, which was 
on the defensive, particularly in the economic field. The JP 
had failed in the pre-1971 period to stop inflation and to 
promote social reforms. Second, the NSP, although a new 
party, still had the earlier experience of its predecessor, 
the NOP, to guide it. And thirdly, the party's propaganda 
was an effective mixture of an Islamist treatise combined 
with a socio-economic preaching.^®
Since no party in the National Assembly had an 
absolute majority, there were limited possibilities of 
setting up a coalition cabinet composed of two or more of 
the four largest parliamentary groups.®® Then the RPP's 
leader Bülent Ecevit, was asked on 27 October 1973 by 
Turkey's president. Fahri Korutürk, to form a government. By 
early November it seemed that the EPP-NSP points of view had 
become much closer, insofar as an eventual agreement for a 
coalition cabinet was concerned. Then on 25 January 1974, 
the text of the coalition agreement was drawn up.®^
Being in power was especially important to the 
NSP: it meant the legitimization of an anti-Kemalist party 
and also provided some security against the possibility of 
its being closed down. However, there were several
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controversial issues which emerged as a result of the
secularist-Islamist controversy. Tûrker Alkan states:
One of the controversial issues after 
the elections had been the question of 
amnesty for political prisoners 
condemned after the 1971 military 
intervention. Members of the coalition 
had voted to pardon those imprisoned 
for opposing secularism, but when it 
came time to pardon the leftists 20 NSP 
members voted 'no'. As a consequence, 
the coalition had almost dissolved.
Several other issues related to the Secularist-Islamist
controversy rendered the work of the RPP-NSP coalition
difficult, and even endangered its existence.®^ So in the
first week of September 1974 there were increasing signs of
serious tension between these partners. Such tensions had
stayed unresolved up until the Cyprus crisis. The Cyprus
military operation brought matters to be known:its success
raised the tension as each of the coalition partners wanted
most of the credit.^“* Eventually, on 18 September 1974
Ecevit resigned over the NSP ministers' voting in the
cabinet against his official trip to Scandinavia.
In November 1974, President, Fahri Korutiirk, asked 
Professor Sadi Irmak to form a government. As all the 
parties represented in Parliament refused to enter such a 
government except for Republican Reliance Party(RRP), Irmak 
formed a government based on RRP, several independent 
Senators, neutral technocrats and professors outside the
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Parliament. He presented the government for a vote of
confidence in the Parliament on 29 November 1974 but he was 
defeated. Nevertheless, the President requested Irmak's 
government to continue for a while. In the seventh month of 
the crisis that followed, Süleyman Demirel, who was leader 
of the JP, succeeded in splitting the DP, gaining some of 
its members, and forming a coalition government supported by 
the JP, NSP, the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), the 
Republican Reliance Party (RPP) and ex-Democratic Party 
members. The "national front" government, as it was then 
called, lasted from March 1975 until December 1977. After 
the elections of 1977, the RPP and some ex-Justice Party 
members formed a coalition government in January 1978. Two 
days after the local elections of 14 October 1979, in which 
the JP won the majority of mayoralties, Ecevit resigned. In 
November 1979 Demirel formed his minority government, which 
stayed in power until 12 September 1980.®’^ The NSP was 
suppressed once again together with all other political 
parties, following the military intervention of September 
12, 1980, by a decree of the ruling National Security
Council
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CHAPTER THREE
The Ideology of the Prosperity Party
In 1983 a new Islamic Party, the Prosperity 
Party(PP), was founded to fill the gap after the closing 
down of the National Salvation Party(NSP).^ The Prosperity 
Party is a continuation of the NSP, Before analyzing the 
ideology of the PP, it is necessary to point out the 
ideological and political environment within which the party 
found itself.
After the military intervention of 1980, all
political parties were banned. The objective of the military
intervention was to strengthen the state and to restructure
Turkish politics by establishing a new institutional and
legal framework. So a new Constitution was prepared to
replace the 1961 Constitution. According to Binnaz Toprak:
The 1982 Constitution was designed to 
correct, among other things, what the 
military saw to be a costly weakness of 
the 1961 Constitution, namely, the 
guarantee of unprecedented individual 
and group rights and liberties in the 
absence of properly drawn limits.^
Also it was argued that this liberal and pluralist political
environment led to excessive politicization of groups and
institutions. As a result, anarchy was seen all over the
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country and government could not control violence. It was 
not some of the university students who took part in 
political violence but also teenagers in secondary schools 
and to these also some workers and unemployed youth can be 
added.^ As a consequence, almost 2,500 persons were killed 
in the 1978 and 1979 period and about 2,000 persons were 
killed during the seven months before the military 
intervention.
Therefore, the new Constitution restricted the 
basic rights and liberties. It put limits also on the 
organization and activities of political parties and 
voluntary associations. For instance, according to the new 
Constitution political parties could not establish women and 
youth organizations. Similarly voluntary associations could 
not deal with political activity and they could not 
cooperate with political parties.^ In addition labor union 
activities were limited in a similar fashion.
Moreover, election system was changed through the 
1983 Election Law in order to solve the problems which arose 
out of the coalition governments. As it was specified in 
chapter two, Turkey had been governed by coalition 
governments between 1974 and 1980.Toprak illustrates this 
change as follov/s:
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A l t h o u g h  the p r o p o r t i o n a l  
representation system was kept, a 
percentage barrier was introduced on 
the basis of which a party that failed 
to receive 10 per cent of the total 
vote could not send representatives to 
the Assembly. In addition, in order to 
gain a seat in a given electoral 
district, parties had to pass a second 
bari'ier at the district level. This 
arrangement, of course, works to the 
disadvantage of minor parties and was 
designed to push the system into a two- 
' party model.®
It was expected that the new electoral system would lead to 
stable governments which are based on clear majorities in 
the Assembly and would exclude the extremist parties, 
including religious ones, from the political arena.
The 1983 Political Parties Law banned also 
political parties top administrative cadres from party 
activity for ten years. Also it imposed the same restriction 
for five years on all members of the pre-1980 Parliament. In 
addition, new parties could not use the names and emblems of 
the old parties. However, although military gave much 
emphasis on a new start, the national elections of November 
1983 indicated that there is a continuity of electoral 
preferences in Turkish politics. It became clear that there 
were significant linkages between old political parties and 
new ones which were established after the permission of 
political activity in 1983. This continuity was seen 
especially on the line of center-right and center-left of
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political structure. The gap in the center-right after the 
closing down of the Justice Party was filled by the 
Motherland Party.® This party won the 45.2 per cent of the 
total vote in 1983 (with an absolute majority in the 
Assembly) and formed the government. The gap in the center- 
left after the closing of the Republican People's Party was 
filled by the Populist Party and the Social Democracy Party, 
both of these parties later merged under the name of the 
Social Democratic Populist Party.® In this political 
atmosphere the Prosperity Party was founded to get the 
Muslim vote in 1983 . Its symbol was a composition which is 
comprising an ear and crescent. The Crescent represents the 
honorable struggle in the World War I and the War of 
Independence v;hich made easy the foundation of the Republic. 
The ear symbolizes prosperity, abundance and peace. Also it 
is the symbol of the will and determination of the Turkish 
nation to exceed the present level of contemporary 
civilization.
The Prosperity Party first distinguishes the term 
"right" (hak) and "false" (batıl). The term right is 
something right under all conditions and the term false is 
something false under all conditions. In this context the 
Prosperity Party defines the Western civilization as false 
and Islamic civilization as right. According to Western
35
civilization, right comes from four sources: the force, 
the majority, the privilege and the benefit. For Prosperity 
Party these sources cannot be the sources of right.
In Islamic civilization right emerge in four 
sources. 1) the basic human rights granted to men by birth: 
those rights are composed of the right to live, the right to 
protect one's own intellect, belief end the family, the 
right to property; 2) the right caused by labor; 3) the 
right emerged from voluntary contracts; 4) the right comes 
from the sense of justice. Nothing can result to right 
except for these four sources. The PP argues that throughout 
the human history right and false fight with each other. The 
different understandings of the right derive from this 
conflict.
Western civilization has a mentality of 
considering the force as superior to right. On the other 
hand Islamic civilization's mentality gives much importance 
to right. In the PP view. Western civilization cannot bring 
happiness to humanity but instead brings oppression. As a 
matter of fact. Western civilization has been oppressing 
the humanity by two systems- capitalism and Communism. Both 
of these systems are basically the same. Because both of 
them are based on the mentality of considering the force as
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superior to right. As a consequence, both capitalism and 
Communism are the systems of "oppressor and oppressed". The 
only difference between these tv/o systems is that the 
political power is the oppressor in Communism but the 
economic power is the oppressor in capitalism.
According to the PP there are two kinds of 
mentality in Turkey. One of them is the "national point of 
view" and the other one is the mentality of the Western 
imitators. The "national point of view" is represented by 
the PP and the mentality of Western imitators is represented 
by the True Path Party (TPP), the Social Democratic Populist 
Party (SDPP) and the Motherland Party (MP). The SDPP defines 
itself as Social Democrat by imitating the Social Democrats 
of Europe. The TPP and the MP define themselves as liberal 
by imitating the liberals of Europe. They are basically the 
same. All three are the Western imitators and give much 
importance to force. All three parties advocate the lending 
money at interest. All three support the unfair taxation 
system. Also, all of them encourage the accession of Turkey 
to the European Community.
The PP distinguishes the countries as being Muslim 
and non-Muslim, i.e as being right and false on 
international level. Secondly, the PP distinguishes the
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parties as imitators of West and as supporters of "national 
point of view" on national level.
The PP defines the development as a combination of 
material and spiritual development. For material 
development, efforts for heavy industry should begin 
immediately. It emphasizes that industrial growth should be 
carried out to correct regional imbalances and disparities 
between income groups.Prosperity should be distributed 
to all people equally. For spiritual development, the number 
of mosques, the prayer leader and preacher schools and Koran 
courses should be increased. In addition, freedom of 
conscience should be protected. So it can be argued that the 
party program and publications of the PP includes both 
religious and non-religious themes.
The PP emphasizes that labor union activities 
should be allowed within the framework of basic rights and 
freedoms. It gives much emphasis on social justice, social 
welfare and political freedoms. It can be argued that the PP 
has been attempting to reach civil servants and workers as
potential party supporters 15
The PP pays much attention to the problem of 
education. For the PP, Turkey's material and spiritual
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development depends on a particular type of educational 
policy. The educational policy should not be only a 
mechanism which teaches imported science, research and 
theory. On the contrary, education must comprise the origins 
of sciences and scientific and cultural activities. Also it 
should be based on an independent policy. Concerning the 
issue of education, the PP insists on religious education. 
For the PP, it is necessary to increase the number of 
religious scholars for the religious education. The PP 
argues that religious education is the base of spiritual 
development. Also religious education will bring into action 
the spiritual potential of Turkish nation which is necessary 
for national development. So religious education should be 
offered on a mass scale. As a result of this widespread 
religious education, a consciousness, which does not permit
the exploitation of religion, would be created. 16
The PP approaches the problems of Turkey with a 
medical metaphor. It diagnoses the "illnesses" of Turkey 
and then explains its prognosis to these illnesses. The 
illness of Turkey are defined as follows:the poverty, the 
famine, the unemployment, the bribery, the inequality 
of opportunity, the exploitation, the subordination, the 
injustices, the inflation, and the depravity.^®
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The PP also points to the causes of these 
illnesses. These causes are the five "microbes" of the 
existing system. First one is the microbe of interest. In 
Turkey capitalist system, which is based on interest, has 
been applied. This is a practice of neo-colonialism. In 
order to produce goods consumed by masses, producers get 
credits with high interest rates. The interest is added to 
the cost of the products and it is paid by poor people who 
buy such products.
Second microbe is the unfair taxation system; 
taxes are paid by poor people. The state gets tax not from 
wealthy but from poor people by means of goods that are sold 
to them.
Third microbe is to print money by the State which 
leads to increase in prices and the value of money 
decreases. While government is printing money and pushing it 
into market, the prices of all goods increase so the value 
of money that is gained by poor people decreases.
Within this system, the Central Bank is announcing 
the value of dollar-Turkish Lira parity everyday and this 
causes decrease in the value of money. As a result of this 
practice, the price of all imported goods and petroleum
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products increase. Parallel to this increase, prices of all 
products also increase and millions of people are exploited. 
The fourth microbe of the prevailing system is the foreign 
exchange.
The fifth microbe in this system is credit. People 
deposit money in a bank v;illingly or unwillingly. But banks 
give credits arbitrarily to supporters of the government. 
There is no equal opportunity for taking credit. Contrary, 
only a minority beside the government benefit from the 
credits. However, they do not pay back the loans they 
obtained. As a consequence, people cannot take credits for 
useful pursuits. And these credits are paid back by the 
money of poor people.
After the PP points out the microbes of the 
existing system, it explains the raison d'etre of this 
system:to work sixty million people as slaves; to take back 
from them whatever these people get; to distribute these 
resources to the Israeli, collaborator companies, touristic 
hotels and swimming pools which are crucial for the 
destruction of oui: national pride and morals; to destroy 
Turkey both materially and spiritually and to harm our 
national pride, history and culture. In order to 
operationalize such a system, the resources which are
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obtained from sixty million people, are collected in two 
pools: one of them is banking system and the other one is 
the state's treasury.
In order to collect the money in banks, the 
interest rate should be increased. Everybody lends then 
their money at such high interest rates. By means of 
taxation, money is collected in the state's treasury. This 
collected money is transferred to the Zionist banks for 
payment of foreign debt; these Zionist banks use this money 
for purchase of tank, airplane and war equipment from 
Israel. In addition, banks give this money as credit to 
collaborator companies. This collected money is used also to 
finance the budget deficit which arise out of wasteful 
utilization of resources. Finally after defining the
prevailing system, the PP calls it Slavery Order 19
3.1 The notion of "Just Economic Order"
As argued before, the PP approaches to the 
problems of Turkey by a medical metaphor. After diagnosing 
the illnesses of Turkey, the PP puts forth its proposed 
cures. The PP introduces the notion of the Just Economic
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Order in contrast to the Slavery Order. The Just Economic 
Order does not allow exploitation at any level of economy. 
It gives equal opportunity to everyone and treats everyone 
equally. It also encourages the useful and constructive 
pursuits by everybody. It encourages the socially useful 
economic activities and removes the unnecessary obstacles to 
development. Let us now turn to how the Just Economic 
Order operates.
For the PP, the Just Economic Order is a complete 
and perfect order. It draws upon beneficial aspects of both 
capitalism and Communism. Capitalism is based upon interest, 
which is a vehicle of oppression and exploitation, and on 
profit, which is an organizing and encouraging factor based 
on right. Although capitalism includes the free-market 
competition organizing the economy, in practice capitalism 
does not prevent the formation of trusts and monopolies. 
Communism is against to interest but it contradicts to human 
nature by opposing to private property right and profit. It 
destructs the economy by central planning in contrast to the 
free-market competition.
Therefore, although the Just Economic Order 
encourages profit, which is an encouraging factor for 
economy, it does not allow the interest to serve as a
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means of exploitation. It allows free-market competition and 
private property right but it does not allow the formation 
of monopolies. So it protects the economy and people from 
the harmful effects of monopolies. That is why the Just 
Economic Order is a perfect order which is based on 
right.
In the Just Economic Order the macro plans of 
regions and the country are made by central government. Also 
investment projects are prepared. So everyone knows which 
projects in agricultural, industrial and service sectors 
will be encouraged to increase efficiency and productivity. 
Individuals and companies can adopt one of these projects 
and carry it out. State encourages such projects and helps 
the realization of the most productive ones. In the Just 
Economic Order, all economic activities are carried out by 
individuals, companies or foundations. State is in charge of 
the general services such as security, administration, 
adjudication, energy and water supply, roads, health and 
education services, transportation and communication 
services.
With the Just Economic Order, a balance between 
production and consumption will be created by restricting 
the 'right to consume' according to one's contribution to
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the economic production. An important economic problem, 
which is the result of enormous gap between the productive 
capacity of man and his unlimited wishes, would thus be 
solved. In the Just Economic Order, money is not a good in 
itself. It is a measure of exchange value between production 
and consumption. It is barely a unit of measurement. It 
shows the amount of one's consumption in accordance with the 
value of his amount of production. So, in the Just Economic 
Order, the amount of money issued is equal to the amount of 
goods produced in the economy.
In the Just Economic Order, there is no interest 
on money because it is the recognition of unjust consumption 
right to those people who do not contribute to the economic 
production. Interest is a means of exploitation and it must 
be abolished. Also there would be no "printing" of money 
exceeding the production limits.
Credit means that anybody can have the right for 
consumption more than the amount of his/her production on 
the condition that it will be paid back. Also credits free 
of interest are given to peasants, workers, civil servants, 
tradesman, and artisans.^^
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By the Just Economic Order, there will be no 
interest, no decrease in the value of money and no banking 
system transferring the money from poor to rich people. Also 
there will be no inflation because inflation is an 
illness of the capitalist system and suppresses the poor 
people. The reasons for inflation in capitalism are the five 
microbes; i.e. the interest, the unfair taxation, the 
printing money, the foreign exchange and the credit. 
However, in the Just Economic Order these microbes do not 
exist. So there is no cause for inflation, which means 
increase in prices and decrease in value of money. On the 
contrary there is no cause for increase in prices either; 
there would be a decrease in prices as a consequence of 
economical and technological development.
For the cost of goods and prices will decrease, 
production will increase. As a result of increase in 
production, unemployment will disappear. Because there are 
no interest and tax, the lowest prices will obtain. 
Therefore, everybody from the neighboring countries will buy 
the goods and services produced in the Just Economic Order. 
That means the real explosion of export. Finally the Just 
Economic Order will balance the income distribution and 
provide prosperity to e v e r y b o d y
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Contrary to other political parties, the PP 
opposes to the accession of Turkey to the European 
Community.Because for the PP the European Community is based 
on the Rome treaty which contains two microbes. In the Rome 
treaty it is said that the basis of economic system will be 
the capitalism. For the PP, capitalism cannot bring 
happiness to people because it leads to unemployment, 
inflation and unequal income distribution. There are 
monopolies in capitalism. In addition, capitalism destroys 
the morality of the people.
Second microbe in the Rome treaty is the argument 
that the roots of cultural civilization stem from the 
ancient Rome. For the PP, origin of the West is indeed the 
ancient Rome but Rome's origin is the ancient Greek and 
origin of the ancient Greek is the ancient Egypt,that is the 
system of Pharaohs who exercised force. The PP argues that 
the West follows the ruling system of Pharaohs. The main 
consequence is to give much credence to force. By means of 
force, the West oppresses the people; the West can bring 
happiness neither to itself nor to other people. 
However, the leader of the PP, Necmettin Erbakan, argues 
that:
If Turkey behaves in close relations 
with other countries, a Common Market 
with Muslim countries should be 
established. This is an appropriate way
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for Turkey's to gain a honored place 
among other countries. Turkey will be 
more powerful and it will protect its 
national interest but we also want to 
establish commercial and friendly 
relations between Turkey and all other 
countries.
The PP advocates the establishment of Islamic 
Common Market which will lead to rapid development of both 
Turkey and other Muslim countries. If 1,5 billion people of 
Muslim countries create a common market and obtain their 
needs from other Muslim countries, there will be a rapid 
development and increase in production.^®
3.2 The PP's Views on Secularization
According to the PP, the origins of the word 
secularization could be found in the ancient Rome and the 
ancient Greek. Secularization means that there do exist 
other people with different views. Their views are not the 
same as our views. Also these people cannot be excluded from 
the social life. Everybody accepts the existence of the 
people with different views. This is the essential idea of 
the notion of secularization.^®/
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The word secularization was used firstly in the 
legal literature after French Revolution. People who had 
made the revolution used this word against the church 
because there was the Inquisition and church suppressed the 
people. So secularization is a word which was used to demand 
human rights from the church.
The ?P, too, encourages the freedom of thought, 
belief and conscience and it treats every type of oppression 
against these freedoms as primitive and as contrary to 
secularism. But in the PP' s program secularism is 
defined as a principle which is not hostility to religion; 
on the contrary it protects the freedom of conscience from 
any violation.
According to the PP, secularization has been used 
wrongly in Turkey. It has been used to suppress the religion 
of Islam. Secularization as it exists in Turkey cannot be 
called secularization but a sheer hostility to Islam.The 
religion of people has been forbidden to themselves. The PP 
argues that there must be religious freedom. In this sense, 
it criticizes the pressure over the women who are wearing 
religious attire while attending universities.
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3.3 The Views of the PP on Kemalism
The PP insists that Kemalism has been treated as
a taboo. The PP argues that if Atatürk could come to Turkey
again nowadays, he would support the PP.^^ First reason is
that Atatürk did not support the American mandate; he called
for national independence. The PP, too, supports national
independence. In Erbakan,s words:
There were people who supported the 
American mandate and people who 
supported the national independence 
before the War of Independence.... Now 
the PP represents the people supporting 
the independence, and these imitating 
parties represent the people supporting 
the American mandate. So Atatürk took 
part of which one? He took part of the 
p e o p l e  w ho  a d v o c a t e s  the
independence.33
Second, the PP argues that it advocates the development of 
heavy industry like Atatürk. And finally, according to the 
PP, Atatürk did not encourage the unification with the 
West; and the PP, too, opposes Turkey's accession to the 
European Community.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Ideology of the Opposing Group
The voice of the opposing faction could be heard 
after the 1991 general elections. This cleavage within the 
PP was a result of the wind of change within the party. The 
Vice-President, Bahri Zengin, explains the necessity of that 
change as follows:
The PP locked around the mosque. Also 
the NSP locked around the community of 
mosque. Yet there are communities other 
than the community of mosque. It was 
necessary to open the PP to these 
communities. For this reason, change 
was necessary.^
Indeed the PP has consisted two rival groups since 
mid-1980s:one is the pro-system faction and the other one is 
the anti-system faction.^ The pro-system faction tries to 
transform the PP into a mass party with minimum concessions 
from its Islamic character. The anti-system faction argues 
that any step for modernization means a deviation from the 
party's pure Islamic character.^ However, the pro-system 
faction control the relationship between the PP and mass 
media and the image of the PP which is created by mass 
media, is prevalent all over the country. For this reason, 
the discontent of the anti-system faction is increasing.
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In addition, both some Islamist Intellectuals and 
the leaders of the PP also accept this dual structure of the 
party and they make a distinction between "the PP in 
Istanbul and the PP in Turkey".·^ Ali Yaşar Saribay argues 
that "the PP in Istanbul" represents the elitist Islam and 
"the PP in Turkey" represents the populist Islam. Elitist 
Islam is a religion of scholars, living in city, whose 
social characteristics represent the middle class values. 
These values include the order, rule-observance, moderation, 
and exclude the sentimentality. Contrarily, populist Islam 
is not rule-observance but sentimental.^ For Saibay, 
populist Islam represents the opposition to elitist Islam.®
Finally, before 1991 general elections there were 
conflicts within the PP about the alliance with Nationalist 
Labor Party (NLP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (RDP). 
Because this alliance was seen as a state operation by some 
party members. For them Kurdish and Turkish nationalism were 
created by state as two rival ideologies by means of the 
alliance of PP-NLP-RDP and alliance of SDPP and People's 
Labor Party (PLP). Also party members argue that this 
alliance was formed despite the opposition of the party's 
executive council.^ In this context Tanil Bora and Ruşen 
Çakır argued before the election that whether the PP will be 
successful or not, there will be a comprehensive and radical
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controversies within the PP after the general elections.® 
After the elections this argument was proven. Although the 
PP became electorally successful and came fourth in terms of 
seats gained in the Assembly, the existing cleaveges within 
the PP become deeper. In the third chapter, the ideology of 
the PP, which is figured by the pro-system faction, is 
delienated. Now, in this chapter, the ideology and the 
reasons of the emergence of the anti-system faction, which 
is opposing to the center of the party will be taken up.
The reasons for the emergence of this anti-system 
faction can be listed as follows: first of all, there has 
been no tradition of intra-party democracy® in the NOP, NSP 
and PP. Except for the interim periods caused by military 
interventions, the NSP and PP have been under the leadership 
of the same cadre, creating a "leadership oligarchy" in the 
NSP and the PP.^° Some party members and deputies opposed 
to this oligarchy. They insist on that there is no 
consultation in party. Erbakan's decisions are the decisions 
of the party. The party's legislation, execution and 
adjucation are collected in one hand. There is no Islamic 
explanation for this oligarchy.·*·^ The anti-system faction 
argued that the top leaders of the party have not been 
elected, that there must be an election (sura) and that 
these people must be elected by means of this election.
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A second important reason of friction is that 
women, who have not been wearing scarves, have been seen in 
the party's advertisements during the 1991 election 
campaign. This was done to reach the votes of the masses. 
This approach is also rejected by the anti-system faction of 
the PP.^3
Third reason of friction is the integration of the 
party into the existing political system. The anti-system 
faction has been arguing that the Prosperity Party must be 
an alternative to the existing political system instead of 
integrating into it. For the anti-system faction of the 
party, the PP should not be a "safety valve" of the
political system 14
To analyze the ideology of the anti-system faction 
some religious and non-religious weekly journals have been 
reviewed and an interview was made with Hasan Mezarcı who is 
a member of Parliament from Istanbul. Although there are 
different points of view within the anti-system faction of 
the PP, Mezarcı was chosen for interview because his views 
are rather interesting and many people deal with him.
This chapter comprises three sections. The view of 
the anti-system faction (notably of Hasan Mezarcı) about the
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existing political system is explained in the first section. 
The second section deals with the its criticisms of intra­
party administration. Finally, in the third section the 
model, which is an alternative to the existing political 
system, is discussed.
4.1 Criticisms to Existing Political System
According to Hasan Mezarcı, any political system's 
main principles, notions, and institutions must be based on 
the historical, religious and cultural institutions of the 
very nation so that it can be accepted by people 
voluntarily. However, Turkey's existing political system's 
main principles, notions, institutions and reforms were 
constructed on the European Christian polytheist culture, 
based on the ancient Greek mythology /Although the Turkish 
Republic was established seventy years ago, arguments 
against the present political system and Kemalism have not 
disappeared. Indeed, there have always been a number of 
riots, uprisings against the system because of religious.
ethnic and other problems. 15
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Mezarcı criticizes Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his 
friends whom he accuses of having brought about the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire by cooperating with the occupying 
enemies- English, French and Italian. Although the Ottoman 
Empire was the sixth biggest power in the world before its 
collapse, now Turkey is ranked 76th. Moreover, Turkey takes 
place even behind most of the former Soviet Republics, the 
Balkan countries and the Middle Eastern countries.^®
Mezarcı argues that the existing political system 
operated successfully for a small Kemalist minority but 
unsuccessfully for the majority because of its unsolved 
religious, ethnic, economic and political problems. All 
parties he says, agreed upon the necessity of political 
change. At this point, the problem of Turkey is not to 
change the governments but to change the system. During the 
last 70 years leftist parties came to power, rightist 
parties came to power but the result has always been the 
same: problems of the country could not be solved. Mezarcı 
says that "a ship can not be rescued by changing only the 
map and compass without changing the captain".
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4.1.1 Criticisms against the notion of Secularism
Hasan Mezarcı defines secularism as polytheism 
which cannot be compatible with the culture and belief 
system of Turks. To him it is not different to say religion 
cannot intervene in state affairs and state cannot deal with 
religious affairs from saying God of Earth cannot be in 
charge of the God of heaven and God of heaven cannot 
interfere to the God of Earth. The God of Muslim people is 
one God of earth and heaven.^®
Therefore, he argues, secularism cannot survive in 
Turkey and it must be removed. Secularism could not survive 
also in Europe. There is no secular state except Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. For this reason there are 
Kingdoms in England, Spain and Belgium and there is Vatican
in Italy 19
4.1.2 Criticisms against the notions of Republic and 
Democracy
Mezarcı argues that republic and democracy are 
empty concepts. Neither democracy nor republic has been
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established in Turkey. He defines Turkish Republic as a 
"Bulgarian" republic and democracy as a "West-German" 
democracy. He claims that Turkey has been directed by 
institutions, superior to the Parliament. Mezarcı insists 
that people assume that Turkey is directed by the Parliament 
whereas there are some institutions (such as the National 
Security Council and the General Staff) superior to the 
Assembly.
These institutions help to initiate military coups 
very often with a claim to "protect" the existing political 
system. Indeed Turkey was directed by generals such as 
Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü until 1950, and all state 
institutions were established by the army. Such coup 
tradition was introduced by Mustafa Kemal by closing down 
First National Assembly, and it still continues. If this 
invisible state administration is not removed from the 
political system, nothing can be done in Turkey. For Mezarcı 
there is democracy in front of the screen and there is 
oligarchy behind the screen.
4.2 Criticisms against the Intra-party administration
After severely criticizing the existing political 
system, Hasan Mezarcı criticizes also his party, the PP,
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first of all for its integrative tendency into the present 
political system. According to him the PP must rather be an 
alternative to the system. Secondly, he has been opposed to 
the party's advertisements in which women without scarves 
have been seen during the campaign period of the 1991 
elections. Finally he criticizes the lack of intra-party 
democracy within the Prosperity Party. Mezarci, observing 
that top leaders of party are not elected but appointed, 
says that there must be a council (şura) and elections. 
Mezarcı claims that every decision is taken by the party 
leader, Necmettin Erbakan. Mezarcı talks about the 
leadership authority in PP and defines Prosperity Party as 
follows: there is no group decision but only the decisions 
of Erbakan. His decisions mean the group decisions.
The leaders of the Prosperity Party have been 
warning Hasan Mezarcı, because of his statements, by arguing 
that the party can be closed because of his criticisms of 
the Kemalist system. Mezarcı opposes this attitude and says 
that if they fear suppression of party as an opposition 
party, they would abandon their views when they come to 
power for fear that the National Assembly can be 
suppressed.
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4.3 Alternative to the Existing Political System
After criticizing both the existing political 
system and intra-party administration, Mezarcı introduces 
his model as an alternative to the existing system. For him 
nobody can apply any political project which has not been 
tested on the life of the state and nation before. Nobody 
has a right to practice any theoretical and illusionary 
model whose results are unpredictable. He assumes that both 
Communism and Kemalism are completely defeated.
Only one model has been tested in Turkish and 
Islamic Political history. This model is the Ottoman Empire, 
the sixth biggest power in the world before its collapse. 
The Ottoman Empire model must again be introduced to Turkish 
political system because it is the only one which fits 
Turkey's historical, religious, geographic,cultural, and 
ethical structure.
The alternative model developed by Hasan Mezarcı 
is based on three principles: Tawhid-Caliphate-Federation. 
Tawhid means unification of people. Since races, languages 
and denominations are different, these people can be united 
voluntarily by means of the principle of Tawhid. In Turkey
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people have Muslim names whether they are rightist or 
leftist, Sunni or Alawi. Even though they live Islamic 
religion at different levels, everyone defines 
himself/herself as Muslim. This is the minimum that they all 
share.
According to Mezarcı the political institution of 
this voluntary unification, the principle of Tawhid, is 
Caliphate. He says that since there is the Vatican in Italy, 
and the Patriarchate in Istanbul, there should also be the 
Caliphate in Turkey. For him the Caliphate should not pass 
from father to son, but rather from assembly to assembly: 
the Caliph represents the religion in his personality. For 
Mezarcı, the Sultanate has no indigenous base, being a 
legacy of Byzantium, Rome and ancient Iran.^®
A voluntary unification among people, which is 
created by means of the principle of Tawhid and the 
institution of Caliphate, would establish a strong political 
infrastructure. Mezarcı argues therefore that a federal 
system could be constructed on such infrastructure unifying 
a divided and fragmented country. In addition, political, 
ethnic and religious demands and needs of people, which 
arise from regional differences, could be supplied by means 
of a federal system.
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Hasan Mezarcı claims that if his propositions are 
adopted, Turkey would become the leader of the world of 
Islam. For him, the existing political system of Turkey is 
not accepted by Turkish people. Not only Turkish people but 
also Syrian people, Iraqi people and Saudi Arabian people do 
not accept their system. According to Mezarcı, the present 
borders in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasia, do reflect 
an imposed order; the present balances were formed by force 
of weapon and by force of our enemies. In this context, the 
Kemalist system, Saddam's system in Iraq, Esad's system in 
Syria and Fahd's system in Saudi Arabia are all the systems 
of tyranny. To Mezarcı, the existing borders between people 
in the Middle East, whose religion is the same, culture is 
the same and history is the same, were drawn by the British. 
Mezarcı asserts that unless these systems and borders 
change, the development of Turkey will be impossible.^®
Mezarcı thinks that his model will unite the 
Turkish people in the short run and the people of the other 
Middle Eastern countries, the Balkans and Caucasia in the 
long run. As a result, the present borders will disappear 
automatically. He argues that his model will lead to the 
destruction of tyrannical systems in Syria, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia, and Turkey will become the leader of the world of 
Islam in a short oeriod of time. Mezarcı insists that the
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Ottoman Empire must be constructed again in order to create 
peace in the Middle Eastern region. According to him, his 
model will create political stability in Turkey, and in 
Middle Eastern, Balkan and Caucasian countries as a result 
of voluntary unification of people living in these 
countries. There should be one state in the region. All 
Muslim people should live together.
Mezarcı points out that the existing borders were 
removed in Europe and asks why Muslims, too, could not 
remove them. He is opposed to the denial of our cultural and 
geographical legacy, insisting that Muslims need to unite 
and develop.
Hasan Mezarcı asserts that if the principle of 
Tawhid, the institution of Caliphate and the federal system 
were established, the system of Middle Eastern and Balkan 
countries would be abandoned by their people. These people 
would prefer to live in a province of the new system instead 
of living under the tyrannical system of their present 
countries. Finally, Mezarcı claims that German, Japan, and 
Russian Empires came to the world scene again and argues 
that the time has come for the revival of the Ottoman 
Empire.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to look at the 
nature of cleavages within the Prosperity Party. For this 
purpose, the historical background of the religious right 
has taken up in the previous chapters. In this sense the 
establishments and the ideologies of the National Order 
Party and the National Salvation Party are explained in 
second chapter. As told, the NOP was established under the 
leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in a liberal political 
environment which appeared after the military intervention 
of 1960 and the 1961 Constitution. Contrary to the 
expectations of many people, this Constitution allowed 
genuine associational freedoms.
As a result, religious forces were able to 
establish the NOP in 1970. However, it was closed down in 
1971 by Constitutional Court because of its tendency toward 
the establishment of theocratic order in Turkey.
In its place a new religious party, the National 
Salvation Party, was founded in 1972. At that time, Erbakan 
was behind the scenes; and the leader of the party
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was Suleyman Arif Emre. Although the NSP was a continuation 
of the NOP, the leaders acted carefully this time to express 
its views within legal limits. The ideology of the NSP can 
be summarized under the five headings: "national point of 
view" which was commonly understood as Islamic; rapid 
industrialization that was seen as necessary for Turkey to 
regain its historical power and influence in the world; 
historical-cultural approach in which family and history had 
much importance; education which was treated as crucial for 
development of Turkey; and social justice. The ideology of 
the NSP included both religious and non-religious themes.
The non-religious discourse of the NSP was seen on 
the subject of the economy. For instance, it insisted on the 
necessity of a rapid industrialization which was seen as the 
surest way for Turkey to regain its historical power. In 
election campaigns, this emphasis on rapid industrialization 
received more attention than questions of moral concern.^
Here the following question should be answered: 
Why have the religious forces established a non-religious 
party? This question can be answered by explaining the 
characteristics of a political party, by pointing out the 
socio-economic environment within which the party found
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itself, and finally by illustrating the nature of 
relationship between a political party and society.
According to Şerif Mardin, the fundamental 
characteristics of a political party are its capability to 
address to opinion of national images and means of national 
development, to concept of Turkish nation and program of 
national economic development.^  Also Ali Yaşar Saribay 
defines the function of a political party within the context 
of modernization process. He argues that as long as a 
society modernized, political parties function not as a 
reflection of ethnic, religious and other divisions but as 
a reflection of economic differences.^ As will be seen 
later, the NSP's function fits to this definition.
After defining the characteristics of a political 
party, it is necessary to point out the socio-economic 
environment within which the NOP Auid NSP found itself. For 
Saribay, in Turkey the development of industrial sector has 
been greater than the development of agricultural sector 
since 1963. This led to sharp functional divisions within 
the economic and social life.·^ He insists on that the NOP, 
which was a predecessor of the NSP, was established as a 
result of this sharp functional divisions within the 
industrializing Turkish society.^ After NOP's closing down
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in 1971 by the Constitutional Court, its mission was 
continued by the NSP. In this context, the NSP was supported 
both by conservative people and by marginal individuals such 
as small traders, artisans and small shopkeepers who lost 
their economic power as a result of rapid socio-economic 
change during 1960s. For the first group the NSP functioned 
as a means of identity, for the second group it functioned 
as an expression of their economic discontent.
Now the relationship between a political party and 
society will be analyzed. A political party reflects the 
structure of society. So the NSP reflects the opinions of a 
group of society. That's why we have to look at the main 
characteristics of the Turkish society. After the 
establishment of the Republic, Kemalists introduced a series 
of reforms designed to eliminate the impact of Islam on 
Turkish society. They tried to substitute new values for the 
religious values. However, Islam remained in underground and 
continued to affect the life of people. After the transition 
to the multi-party politics, the militant secularism of the 
single-party era loosened and Islam became more visible in 
social and political life. Islam is an important factor in 
social life as a symbolic system which forms the bases of 
both individual and community-based identity. Also it gives 
a meaning to human existence. In this context, there is no
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contradiction between Islam and secularism in the minds of 
Turkish people who are religious in their private life and 
secular in their public roles. ^ They do not vote for a 
religious party and oppose any religious attack on Kemalist 
reforms, but they privately observe religious duties such as 
daily prayers or fasting during the holy month of Ramazan. 
So Turkish people makes an interesting reconciliation 
between the secular and religious ideology. For this reason, 
secularism and Islam have lived together easily in the 
Republican period.
Richard and Nancy Tapper initiated a research
project on religion and society in a provincial town of
Eğirdir in İsparta. They make a following observation about
the togetherness of secularism and Islam:
The townspeople see republican values 
as underwriting most of their 
activities in this world, whex'eas they 
see Islam as mostly about the life 
hereafter. They often talk about a 
division between material (maddi) and 
spiritual (manevi) domains, and they 
treat republicanism and Islam as two 
separate ideologies, of which the 
former is of wider temporal scope.
Tapper and Tapper use the word of accommodation in 
the place of reconciliation. They argue that the people of 
Eğirdir are aware of the accommodation between secularism 
and Islam in certain areas. They list three types of
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accommodation which are seen common. The first consists of 
the suggestion that some specific Islamic rule was 
associated with particular historical period and other 
Islamic values are appropriate today: for instance the 
Prophet prohibited alcohol because all Arabs drunk more and 
he could not solve this problem in other way. In fact, Islam 
favors moderation in all things.®
A second type of accommodation involves the 
argument that the secular republican institutions function 
in exactly the same way as the Islamic institutions. So the 
former can substitute the later: for example, people know
that income and taxes paid to the state to support 
hospitals, education, the salaries of religious teachers and 
so on, and thus replace Islamic alms and tithes.®
A third type of accommodation is where religious 
values are rationalized by an appeal to modern secular 
values. Thus prayer, and fasting during Ramazan are 
considered as good for the health because of the need of a 
regular exercise of the body.^®
Therefore, it can be argued that secular and 
religious ideologies are not contradictory ideologies.in 
the minds of the Turkish people. In the mean time, the NSP
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v/as legitimized itself by means of the support of the 
Turkish people. So it could not survive in the Turkish 
political structure unless it articulated the Turkish social 
structure. If the NSP's ideology include only religious 
themes, it could not easily get a support from the people. 
Therefore, it is not contradictory that the NSP's ideology 
include both religious and non-religious themes.
At this point it is necessary to deal with the 
liter Turan's observations, which are helpful to understand 
the question of why religious forces have established a non­
religious party, about the role of religion as a political 
ideology in Turkey. First, religion is the one of the 
elements of a political counter-culture. The content of this 
culture has varied parallel to social and economic changes 
in society. This counter-culture has attracted individuals 
who have been unable to cope with change and have been 
pushed into marginal status in society.
Secondly, the political ideologies, which are 
permeated by religious values, are not necessarily 
homogeneous. Although there may be consensus among them that 
religious values should be given a greater place in 
political life, questions on which values, to what extent,
75
and in what ways, are answered differently among different 
groups.
Thirdly, the presence of competitive politics in 
society has reduced the militant secularism of the central 
government. Because all major political parties have adopted 
a more tolerant attitude towards the public role of 
religion. As a result, the role of religion as a political 
ideology has declined considerably.^^
The NSP gained an important electoral success in 
the 1973 elections. Then it took part in coalition 
governments between 1974 and 1977. So it was legitimized the 
religious party in Turkish politics and it provided security 
against its being closed down. But after the military 
intervention of September 12, 1980, the NSP was banned, 
together with all other political parties.
The Prosperity Party, a new Islamic party, was 
established in 1983 to obtain the Muslim vote. The PP is a 
continuation of the NSP. Its leader is again Necmettin 
Erbakan.
After 1990, some PP members and deputies who have 
radical views about their party and the problems of Turkey,
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started to express views different from their party's 
ideology. This had not been seen either within the NOP or 
within the NSP. Although there were some rival groups within 
the NSP, they were suppressed by party leaders.
It is now in order to turn to the differences 
between the ideology of the Prosperity Party and the 
ideology of the anti-system faction within it. The 
mainstream PP does not introduce radical reforms to change 
the existing political system but offers some solutions to 
treat the illnesses of the system if one uses a medical 
metaphor. For instance the mainstream PP argues that the 
interest, the foreign exchange and fiduciary note issue must 
be abolished because they led to create unemployment, 
inflation and poverty. In addition, unfair taxation system 
and credit system should be revamped. The state should levy 
tax from wealth not from income and credit must be given to 
people who will use it for socially useful pursuits and not 
to a few people supporting the government. Also credit 
should not be given to people who invest it in touristic 
hotels and swimming pools which leads to the destruction of 
national pride and morals. As a result it can be said that 
the criticisms of the mainstream PP are based on economic 
deficiencies of the prevailing system. However, the 
mainstream PP does not direct any criticisms to the
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political system. The reason of this attitude among the 
party leaders is that still there is a fear that their party 
might be closed down so they make criticisms to the economic 
system only. As other opposition parties make criticisms on 
the economy there is no difference between other opposition 
parties and the mainstream PP. This means that there is no 
risk for being closed down by the Constitutional Court.
The anti-system faction does not make criticisms 
on the existing economic system. It offers radical solutions 
to change the political system. For example, it proposes to 
remove the existing borders between Turkey, Caucasia, Balkan 
and the Middle Eastern countries. Also it suggests the 
removal of the republic and the establishment of Caliphate.
While the mainstream PP is offering an alternative 
economic system which is called the "Just Economic Order", 
the anti-system faction offers an alternative political 
system which is based on the principles of Tawhid-Caliphate- 
Federation. This difference is also seen in their criticisms 
against capitalism and communism. The mainstream PP argues 
that both capitalism and Communism have been defeated in 
economical sense. But for the anti-system faction only 
Communism has been defeated in a political sense.
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However, the party program defines the secularism as a 
principle which is not hostility to religion, on the 
contrary it protects the freedom of conscience from any 
violation.
Contrary to the mainstream PP, the anti-system 
faction defines secularism as polytheism which cannot be 
compatible with Turkey's culture and belief system. The 
group argues that it is not different to say religion cannot 
intervene in state affairs and state cannot deal with 
religious affairs from saying God of Earth cannot be in 
charge of God of heaven and God of heaven cannot interfere 
to God of Earth. God of Muslim people is one God of both 
earth and heaven. Therefore, secularism cannot survive in 
Turkey and it must be abandoned.
There is a similarity between the mainstream PP 
and the anti-system faction only on the subject of accession 
of Turkey to the European Community. Both factions oppose to 
the accession of Turkey to the European Community.
However, there is a difference between the 
mainstream PP and the anti-system faction about the 
relationship with other Muslim countries. The mainstream PP 
argues that Turkey will be leader of the world of Islam in
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the Just Economic Order. But it proposes an economic unity 
rather than political unity of Muslim countries and 
formation of an Islamic Common Market.
On the contrary, the anti-system faction ta.lks 
about the political unity of Muslim countries by removing 
the existing borders between Turkey, Caucasia, Balkan and 
Middle Eastern countries. It proposes a political unity, 
naturally there will be an economic unity later on. In this 
sense the mainstream PP is more nationalist than the radical 
group. Of course, this is an important difference from the 
anti-system faction.
The change within the PP and its outcome, i.e the 
cleavage between the anti-system faction and the mainstream 
PP, is the product of the social and cultural changes which 
Turkey has undergone especially in the last decade. Since 
1980 people have migrated from rural to urban centers. It is 
seen a psychological depression and an identity crisis among 
these urban migrants who feel themselves as marginal 
individuals in the existing system. That's why, they behave 
reactionary to this system. The PP is seen as a party that 
proposes an alternative system and solves the socio-economic 
problems of the country. For this reason, the urban migrants 
turn towards the politics of the PP.
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Meanwhile, the PP realized that it could not reach 
to the mass with its strict anti-secular policies. So it 
adopted different kinds of propaganda methods. Its 
application was seen during the election campaigns of the 
1991 general elections: women, who have not been wearing 
scarves, were seen in the party's advertisements. By this 
method, the PP aimed to reach the votes of mass. It became 
successful in the 1991 general elections and increased its 
vote.
The urban migrants demand only concrete solutions 
to their socio-economic problems. They do not want to live 
in a system which is ordered by Islamic rules and values. 
Because as is argued earlier secular and religious 
ideologies are not contradictory ideologies in the minds of 
the Turkish people. Also they are aware of the accommodation 
between secularism and Islam in certain areas.
So if the mainstream PP produces concrete policies 
to solve the socio-economic problems of the country, it will 
take an important place within the Turkish political life. 
First of all, the PP must give a meaning to the concept of 
the Just Economic Order. Because even Islamic intellectuals 
argue that the Just Economic Order is an empty concept.
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I argue that the anti-system faction would leave 
the party because it could not express itself within the PP 
under these conditions. If they leave the party, they would 
not form another pure Islamic party. Because it is not a 
homogeneous group but there are different points of view 
within the group.
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